Child labour: regional approaches

July 2nd, 2009

This is a paper I gave at a research student conference at SOAS on regions and regional studies (PDF: High Quality - Web Quality). As well as the embedded video, you can download the talk in higher quality MP4 format.

The general theme of the paper is that the history of child labour in Africa is something that needs to be studied on a surprisingly wide geographical scale. It was pretty useful to write. In particular, it finally forced me to learn Adobe InDesign - the PDF is quite heavily illustrated and trying to lay it out in MS Word was like nailing an uncooperative eel to a wall.

Households, Hometowns and Migrations in the Colonial Era: The Circulation of Child Labour in the Gold Coast’, paper presented at the conference Regional Studies and Critical Perspectives on Regions, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, 5-6 June, 2009.

Is child labour wrong?

June 19th, 2008

How awful….

Child labour is right below child soldiering on the won’t-someone-please-think-of-the-children scale of moral outrage. Child labour, everyone agrees, is a Problem. And it is an apparently huge problem: the International Labour Organization counts 5-11 year olds as child labourers if they do one hour of work a week!1 Concerned parents should buy a dishwasher ASAP.

But as long as violence and coercion aren’t involved then I’m not convinced that child labour is such a problem, and it’s certainly not a problem solved by feeling guilty about who sewed your socks together, passing unenforceable laws or making empty Declarations.

The roots of child labour

Despite child labour being forbidden by the constitution and the Children’s Act in Ghana, for example, child labour is still common.2 There is a simple reason for this. The use of child labour is not driven by legislative fiat but by a cost-benefit analysis: can a family - or a whole society - afford its children to be an economic burden rather than an economic asset? That is, do the the long-term benefits of education or carefree innocence outweigh the loss of labour power to the family unit for some or all of childhood? Legislation probably complicates this decision - by adding the threat of prosecution, say, or immediate rewards for schooling - but it doesn’t override it.

One of my research aims is to explore the changing use and usefulness of child labour in colonial Ghana. I suspect it is an uneven process, and that an increase in societal wealth does not necessarily lead to a linear decline in child labour. Instead, the value of children’s labour is determined by numerous economic, technological and demographic shifts.

Historical approaches

Some possible determinants of child labour in African history include:

- The availability of adult labour. Demographic trends and shocks - for example the Atlantic slave trade or the present AIDS epidemic - inevitably alter a society’s reliance on child labour.

- New uses for child labour: tending cash crops (cocoa etc) on family farms might be a relevant historical example, and industrialisation and the factory system a possible future dilemna.

- Childhood choice and ambition based on new economic opportunities. The growth of education and an African staffed colonial bureaucracy, for example, created a growing disdain for manual work. I have found one case from the late-1940s of a boy living vagrant in Accra after running away from his home and apprenticeship because he thought that ‘washerman’ was a dishonourable trade.

- Technical and infrastructural changes. The availability and quality of education affects long-term planning. And the availability of mains water and electricity and kitchen appliances cuts down on demand for child labour within the household. But other trends might increase the need for child labour - there is some intriguing evidence that this was the case in the Gold Coast.

Given the complexity of the topic, it is a bit rich for the West to simply say that you can’t use child labour because it’s morally wrong and all children should be in school. Maybe it is and maybe they should - but maybe not.

References:
1Kaushik Basu and Zafiris Tzannatos, “The Global Child Labor Problem: What Do We Know and What Can We Do?,” World Bank Econ Rev 17, no. 2 (December 1, 2003)
2For example: ‘Child Labour Still Prevalent, LRC Calls for Affirmative Action’, Ghanaian Chronicle, 13th June 2008, http://allafrica.com/stories/200806130975.html

African history in the Old Bailey?

May 2nd, 2008

Last weekend the full archive of the Old Bailey court records from 1674-1913 went live. It’s freely accessible and full-text searchable. It’s an incredible resource - and it ground to an expected but gratifying halt due to the volume of traffic at launch.

The digital promise

The great thing about digital archives for historians is that peripheral sources that are normally too time consuming to track down can be used with the same ease as those from a subject- or location-specific archive. The history of Britain’s African colonies, for example, relies on a canon of missionary and government sources held in the UK, and national and regional archives in Africa. Other archival sources are underused because the ratio of useful material to research hours is too unrewarding. With searchable archives, data-mining etc., the potential cost of research could become trivial.

As an experiment, I spent half an hour looking for African history in the records of a London courtroom - and it’s there alright. I ran searches on place names, personal names, ethnic epithets and racial slurs. Even that wasn’t very time-consuming, but it’s easy to imagine APIs that would allow you to query a digital archive, or set of archives, with a set of keywords relevant to your research, and return a group of potential files. This kind of stuff has enormous potential.

The African diaspora: crime and respectability

Using a series of fairly obvious search terms, for example, threw up some intriguing material on African history. Most obviously, there is information on the lives of Africans or their descendants in London, of whom there were many. The defence of highwayman Joseph Guy in 1767 was that ‘There are a thousand black men in London besides me’. Unsurprisingly, most appear in criminal contexts. Poor Thomas Robinson (’a Negro Black Boy ‘), for example, was sentenced to death for house-breaking and stealing ‘divers Goods’ in 1724. But others were respectable citizens. John Bardoe was bought as a slave in Lagos by a Genoese sea-captain and, when their ship docked in London in 1859, Bardoe apparently freed himself with the aid of a fellow countryman and began working for another Italian. Bardoe then fell ill and, in a feverish state, assumed he was being recaptured. He first barricaded himself into his room, then made a break for it and stabbed a policeman in a rooftop chase. An interesting story in itself - but the translator at the trial was ‘Miss. M. B. Servano, a native of Yorubah, and educated in England’. There are lots of interesting analytical details there: social networks among Africans in London, the continuation of slavery at sea, perceptions of freedom, and the education of African women. Bardoe was found to have acted in self-defence and judged not guilty.

Young migrants

But the Old Bailey material also has the potential to feed back into research on Africa itself. One area of my research that looks particularly promising is the migration of children within and to the Gold Coast. The detailed records I have of this phenomenon date from after WWII, so I was fascinated to discover the story of John Prince, a West African who in 1908 was working as a servant in London. A Doctor Bayfield had employed Prince, then aged about sixteen, in West Africa and brought him to London on his return to Europe. Prince later defrauded Bayfield and was imprisoned for one day before being seen off to Liverpool by the court missionary. I have no idea what court missionaries do, so I’m not sure if Prince’s treatment was normal - or if this was exceptional treatment doled out to an African.

The great ship robbery

Conditions on the West African coast also make an appearance because some crimes at sea seem to have been prosecuted in London rather than locally. In 1848, for example, the prominent Gold Coast merchant Andrew Swanzy had chests containing 1760 ounces of gold dust - now worth a cool $1.5 million - stolen from the brig Lemuel while it was anchored offshore close to the town of Cormantine. Three crew members struck out in a longboat laden with booty. They were captured on a beach eastwards of Cormantine, where ‘a great number of natives’ were hauling the booty away from the surf. This is an interesting crime. Was it pre-arranged? How much contact did European crews have with locals in African port towns? Was this a criminal alliance where class (or greed) was more important than colour? Or were the ‘natives’ robbing the robbers?

Potential histories

There are, I’m sure, a lot more intriguing cases in these archives that would illuminate history far beyond the parochial borders of London or Britain. Digital history is so exciting because it provides the potential for a truly global history - a history not just written about the whole world, but that draws its evidence from a global store of knowledge, and is written, researched and distributed using methods that are independent of place.

Cool things from the Ghana National Archives in Accra

April 26th, 2008

Instead of a proper post, here are some things I took photos of when I was in the archives in Accra.

Court Records

This is basically my PhD - a vast tome of misbehaving children. Some dastardly colonialist decided not to spring for a new book so it’s stuffed full of extra papers - I had many “it came apart in my hands, guv” moments while working with it. After taking photos of every single page, I set fire to it so that no one else can research my topic.

Olde Worlde Maps

After WWII the colonial government decided that wartime trauma could best be assuaged by building children’s playgrounds. This led to an outbreak of NIMBYism on an epic scale. I particularly like this map that shows a proposed children’s playground in between the HQ of the United Africa Company (Unilever), a prison and the palace of the Ga chief. Guess whether it got built or not?

These two maps are of the playgrounds themselves. They were on weird wax paper and had mostly disappeared, but they look quite cool anyway.

Currency

A cheque with an elephant on it from the Bank of British West Africa:

I don’t understand why this receipt/invoice has a stamp stuck on it:

Jack Sharpe, Scout Outfitter:

Full size photos are on my flickr page.

Review: Tim Harford - The Logic of Life

February 17th, 2008

I’m a fan of Tim Harford, aka the Undercover Economist, and author of a very interesting blog at the FT. He is an excellent example of the division of labour, one of his favourite things, successfully hoovering up dull economics papers and rolling out readable prose. His second book, The Logic of Life, is not really about Africa. It is mostly about how cities are great, and how people who live in the country are carbon-hungry subsidy-hounds. It’s really good.

The undercover Africanist

But there are a couple of relevant sections, including a useful discussion of post-colonial African agriculture drawn from Bates’ Markets and States in Tropical Africa. Harford also discusses disease and development. He argues that malaria control is of secondary economic importance to AIDS control because, while malaria mostly affects children, AIDS primarily affects economically more productive adults. (He’s not totally heartless, just an economist.) He also argues that disease control is itself secondary to, and follows from, the establishment of institutions that incentivise economic innovation and wealth creation.

Won’t somebody please think of the children?

I think he might be wrong about malaria. This is mostly guesswork on my part. But, judging by the notes, it was also mostly guesswork by Harford - so wild conjecture is allowed (and fun of course).

Even if we just consider malaria in younger children - the least economically productive demographic - the disease has a spillover impact on household economics. First, children don’t suffer an illness alone: they are nursed, probably by a more economically-productive family member. Serious treatment probably involves a time-consuming trip to a non-local medical facility. Sickness in the young therefore removes important child labour from the household economy, and the labour of healthy adults. Second, the high likelihood of a child dying creates a rational incentive to have more children. Pregnancy, childbirth and post-natal care reduce the availability and productivity of female household labour for lengthy periods. High childhood mortality reduces the eventual economic payoff for this sacrifice. And, third, medical facilities spend an inordinate amount of time on childbirth or treating childhood malaria, skewing medical provision away from temporarily-sick, but otherwise economically-productive adults.

AIDS and malaria

Harford goes on to argue - correctly I suspect - that AIDS is a more significant direct economic problem than malaria. But in areas with a high incidence of both diseases, AIDS and malaria may be linked. AIDS has already reduced the stock of econimcally productive adults and created a scary number of child-headed households: their economic viability is thus under great pressure from childhood malaria. And, in adult-headed households, child mortality may increase AIDS infection rates. First, the replacement of childhood malaria victims by (un)knowingly HIV-positive parents, perhaps with a new partner, is a rational choice with socially harmful consequences. And second, pregnancy does not just reduce the domestic and agricultural productivity of women, it may also temporarily remove their sexual labour from the household. Bored and impatient fathers thus have an increased incentive to find another sexual partner, and the corollary increased risk of contracting and passing on AIDS.

Disease and development

Harford ultimately argues that disease has been controlled elsewhere after economic growth, and that growth was secured by establishing institutions that preserved and encouraged the creation of economic wealth. True enough, I expect. But it is also true that the technology to control malaria already exists, and where these technologies are imperfect, the incentive to innovate certainly exists. African history has been marked by efforts to control, direct and increase labour power (if not always productivity). So if African governments need to create or reform economic institutions then a good place to start might be anti-malarial projects that protect and encourage such ‘wealth in people’.

Tim Harford, The Logic of Life: The Rational Economics of an Irrational World:

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What is tradition? Ritual mutilation and traditional ignorance at the UN.

February 6th, 2008

Some jargon

‘Embodied power’ is an important concept for my research on the history of childhood in colonial Africa. This pretentious academic jargon simply means the physical markings on the body that are used to display citizenship, to mark the transition through age grades, or to complete puberty rites. In Africa this means things like scarification, circumcision, clitoridectomy and other forms of ritual mutilation. Most of these operations are performed by adults on children, or on children who are becoming adults, so ritual mutilation is vital to a historical understanding of generational power.

Embodied power now: the UNPFA and the trouble with aid workers

Ritual mutilation is still a live issue. In Ghana, you can get 5-10 years for practising female genital mutilation. Sounds fair. The 6th February was catchily declared the International Day Against Female Genital Mutilation by the United Nations Population Fund. It’s hard to fault their good intentions. But the UNFPA also claim that genital mutilation is “deeply entrenched in social and cultural tradition”.1 The word tradition is always bad news.

Traditions might be old and they might be entrenched. But they might be very young and not entrenched at all. Cultural practices have historical roots, and history springs up all over the place. To be fair, the UNFPA website does ask “Where does the practice come from?”. But, to return to being unfair, this is answered with meaningless waffle and a meek admission that its origins are “unclear”.2 The social causes are apparently the economic weakness of women and the desire to control female sexuality. Well, duh. But why now, why here and since when?

The UNFPA, in short, has no idea what it is trying to combat. Shouldn’t it try and find out? Well, no, probably not.

For western development and aid workers - as for colonial officials - detailed local knowledge is unnecessary and annoying: it makes your job more difficult.3 You don’t need to know much about the roots of the problem at all. You need to know how to arrange a conference, how to extract funding from governments, how to write a glossy report - and which paved streets in Accra are too narrow for your air-con SUV. In fact, knowing too much might make your job irrelevant. Maybe your mate who works for the imaginary UN Road Building Initiative has more influence over clitoridectomy than you do, so it’s probably best not to find out. And, ultimately, if your development or advocacy group is successful - and understanding the problem makes this more likely - then you put yourself out of a job.

Not that I’m cynical.

Embodied power in history: a Xhosa example

But if the UNPFA did get its act together, what might it find? I think they’d find that clitoridectomy etc are not ‘traditional’, but contingent on local historical dynamics.

Let’s ignore clitoridectomy and consider a South African example of embodied power: the Xhosa ‘custom’ of ingqithi, the exarticulation of the last joint of a finger. It was a marker of citizenship, control and belonging; children normally had the operation at about three years old, but it could be delayed until as late as eighteen if the child lived away from the village. So far, so anthropological. But the statistical study of this practice also allows the problem to be approached from a historical perspective.4

In 1964, a Transkei mission-hospital doctor surveyed all visiting patients to see if they practised this ‘tradition’, and made two unsurprising findings: that incidence of ingqithi was smaller among both educated and Christian patients. But he also noted the age of his patients so it is possible to track the probable date of the operation and any chronological trends. Surprisingly, there is not a linear decline of this custom. There is a clear peak of ingqithi in the interwar years, approximately 50% higher than in the decades before WWI and after WWII. European cultural values were clearly not simply destroying an indigenous tradition – ‘tradition’ was itself a historical product and dynamic.

One useful route for histories of African childhood would be to trace the driving forces behind the desire, among young and old alike, to control children’s bodies and identities. For the Transkei, for example, this might involve studying Xhosa relationships to encroaching mission and independent Christianities, but also the increased incidence (not always with parental blessing) of migratory child labour to Natal. We can also speculate on the impact of ingqithi on productivity: if you have 9-and-a-bit fingers, are you still able to perform nimble-fingered tasks with industrial machinery, or are you only good for hoeing?

References:
1. Interview with UNFPA director.
2. “The practice of FGM/FGC has been followed by many different peoples and societies across the ages and the continents”. UNPFA FAQs on FGM.
3. On the similarities between aid workers and colonial officials see this review by Justin Willis.
4. All statistics are from Jansen, G., ‘Some observations about ritual mutilation in a Transkei mission hospital, with special reference to the ingqithi-custom’, African Studies, 25, 2 (1966), pp73-9.

Football in colonial Africa: an article by me on Pitchinvasion.net

February 1st, 2008

In honour of the thrilling footballing spectacle that is the Africa Cup of Nations, I’ve written an article about football in colonial Africa. It’s published on the excellent and intelligent Pitch Invasion site. The article draws quite heavily on the work of Peter Alegi on South Africa and Phyllis Martin on Congo Brazzaville, but also incorporates some research I’ve done on the Gold Coast and the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt.

I’ll post a pdf with full scholarly references as soon as I’ve figured out how Adobe InDesign works.

Africa Cup of Nations: a historian speaks

February 1st, 2008

The historian of South African football, Peter Alegi, is featured on the latest Africa Past and Present podcast talking about the African Nations Cup. You can also go to their website and subscribe to the whole series.

Alegi points out that Africa had a continent-wide national tournament two years before Europe did (1958 vs 1960), and shares his thoughts on the tournament so far. He reckons that Cote d’Ivoire will edge out Egypt in the final - although as those two will now meet in the semi, that ain’t happening. He’s probably right about Cote d’Ivoire, although I think the odds on Egypt (8.4) are still generous. The real value is probably laying Cameroon, who at 8.2 are now available at shorter odds than Egypt. Why? And continuing my pro-North Africa theme, Tunisia might be worth backing, if only to lay them off after they dump Cameroon out of the quarters.

Anyway, Peter Alegi sounds like a very nice bloke. I’ve read a couple of interesting articles by him. One, about the first African international club tournament, is available online. He also has a full-length book on South African football, Laduma!, and another one on African football and capitalism forthcoming. I’ll be reading both of them.

African Nations Cup and the history of football in Africa

January 22nd, 2008

Great news, the Africa Cup of Nations has started. Or, if you are a Premier League manager, terrible news, the Africa Cup of Nations has started. I predict two things:

1. Everyone will call the tournament the African Nations Cup, which is much snappier and surely the name everyone used in the past?

2. Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire will both self-destruct, and someone else will win it. Holders Egypt are still available at 8/1 at Betfair, even after whacking Cameroon 4-2 in fine style. I’d say that’s good value, whereas Ghana (4/1) and especially Cote d’Ivoire (3/1!) are bad value. The tournament seems to be suffering from the credit crunch, so there isn’t much liquidity, but it might pick up in the later stages.

So, as the point of this blog is history, here is my take on the history of Ghanaian football. It’s not very representative as it’s based on a single file from the Ashanti regional archive. The documents were mainly produced during the WWII. But they are quite interesting, and it’s a good excuse to show some cool pictures. The main question is: is football just a game? Probably not.

Firstly, football may have reflected growing ethnic rivalries within multi-ethnic states. For example, in 1942 the New Britons, a team from Tarkwa in SW Ghana, resolved at their AGM “to crush down in this year all the Kotoko Teams”.1 Kotoko, a common team name, meant porcupine and was also symbol of Asante nationhood. The club motto of Asante Kotoko was “Thousand Killed, Thousand Comes”. This referred to the military strength of the defeated Asante empire, now a constituent part of Britain’s Gold Coast colony. But the motto was also a measure of Asante’s political tenacity. The slogan was later associated with the National Liberation Movement - a specifically Asante alternative to the nationalist party that would lead multi-ethnic Ghana to independence, Nkrumah’s CPP.2 By September 1942, the Mighty Britons had defeated four Kotokos, scoring 14 goals and conceding just four.

Football may also have added more formality and structure to divisions based on region, race and religion. The appeal of the game cut across such boundaries - matches were announced on the radio in Twi, Hausa and English - but teams were more divisive. Muslims in Obuasi, probably northern migrants or members of the Hausa diaspora, played in the Mahommedans team. There is evidence that elsewhere in Africa different ethnicities voluntarily kept their distance during leisure activities. But football had some unique structural features. Teams (and perhaps fans) were visually differentiated through uniforms. The continuity of team and player registration made these divisions more formal and persistent. And matches and tournaments made fans and teams antagonistic, rather than indifferent, to their sporting/ethnic/religious rivals. This interpretation is firmly embedded in the conspiracy theory school of history: it shouldn’t be taken too seriously without a lot more direct evidence.

Football was also inherently political. Its popularity made it a source of prestige. This could be the prestige of personal skill, as for Ekow Glenland, who told the FA he was “commonly known as Kimpo the Devil Boy”. Football also bestowed prestige by association. The patron of Asante Kotoko was none other than Agyeman Prempeh II - Prempeh was the Asantehene (the Asante king), an office abolished then later reinstated by the British. And football was inevitably subjected to the concerns of imperial power. Matches during WWII, for example, were frequently held to support war charities.

Anyway, that’s more than enough history. Here are some more football club letterheads, plus sarcastic comments about their mottos.


Bonos Mores = good manners in Latin. Unnecessary showing off.


From the days when it was OK to have Scottish football role models.


I agree.


A common defense in war crimes tribunals.


Definitely my favourite, despite its rubbishness. We can safely assume that biros were not rationed during the war.

References:

1. This, and everything else here, is taken from the Ashanti Regional Archive, ARG 7/10/4 Obuasi Football Association.
2. Jean Allman, The Quills of the Porcupine: Asante Nationalism in an Emergent Ghana (Madison, 1993), p.16.

Review: Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962

January 18th, 2008

Bush’s Bookshelf

Any book whose cover proclaims that it is “on the reading list” of George W. Bush is irresistible - although this vague formulation doesn’t make it clear if Bush has actually read this, or indeed any other, book. Despite the dubious presidential seal of approval, Horne’s account of the French-Algerian war is very good. He crams the years 1954-62 into 600 pages of journalistic prose. The result is pacy, detailed and - considering the acronym-heavy nature of Algerian politics - relatively clear. It’s not conceptually brilliant, but as a narrative of a fascinating, complex and important conflict, it works very well - exactly the kind of book a President might want to read after tiring of My Pet Goat.

The Algerian War of Independence

A horribly simplified narrative of the war might run like this:

Algerian nationalists experienced decades of disappointment as political reforms were blocked or watered down by the settler lobby. The Front de Libération Nationale was founded in 1954 as a military alternative to the failed reform movements. This small vanguard party launched attacks on French targets on 1st November, and the war began. Throughout the conflict, French reprisals for (often brutal) attacks by the FLN were violent, sustained and - most importantly - indiscriminate. French violence towards moderates and civilians created a steady flow of resentment and a critical mass of support for the FLN. This support was never universal, and certainly not natural, as simplified narratives of nationalism suggest. Instead, support for the FLN emerged from the dynamics of the war, and ultimately made the conflict unwinnable for the French. Algeria gained independence in July, 1962 - but not before the conflict destroyed the Fourth Republic, and took France to the brink of civil war.

Horne does a good job of detailing the many complexities of the war, both in Algeria and France, that this summary misses out. It is well worth a read. But I just wanted to pick up a couple of interesting points on the importance of childhood in creating nationalists and rebels - something I’ve previously discussed for white settlers.

Childhood

Horne offers potted biographies of many of the war’s protagonists, and it is striking how often a childhood experience emerges as both revelation and motivation for future FLN members. The injustices of colonial rule could emerge in dramatic or subtle ways. Ahmed Ben Bella, Algeria’s first President, moved from his village to attend school, and was shocked to find that the football teams at Tlemcen were segregated. Krim Belkacem noticed that Europeans were recorded on the school register in blue, and Muslims in red. Mohamedi Said saw his grandparents slapped by a French officer. And Hassiba Ben Bouali became aware of the 1945 massacres by French forces while still at school. Such injustices explained older French misfortunes. Ben Bouali’s parents told her that Hitler’s invasion was a divine reprisal for the mistreatment of Muslims. And they would justify, too, the violence of the FLN: the war of Algerian independence was a final, homegrown punishment for the cruelty and indifference of French empire.

But if the colonial experience marked childhood so dramatically, it did not create universal political awareness: explanation and interpretation as adults was sometimes necessary for the creation of revolutionary nationalists. Ali la Pointe, the FLN leader portrayed in The Battle of Algiers, had a childhood marred by poverty, pederasts and petty crime - but it was not until he was imprisoned for resisting arrest that jailed FLN activists linked his experiences to the structures of colonialism. For others, childhood created nationalist feeling but they became revolutionary only as adults, motivated by pre-war political inertia or the undiscerning French repressions during the conflict itself. [61, 77, 131, 185, 187]


Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace:
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