Archive for December, 2007

Childhood, nationalism and racism in Algeria: Albert Camus’s The First Man

Monday, December 17th, 2007

Making nationalists

Children are not born as ideologues: so how and when do they become racists, nationalists, socialists, colonialists or subjects? And children are not necessarily born into ideologies: provincial societies do not become nations overnight; the transition from, say, communist revolution to hegemony is both gradual and uneven; and families may react to encroaching political or religious orthodoxies by eagerly adopting, opposing or just ignoring them. Children are thus often born into ambiguity and flux: the question is whether they eventually accept a social consensus and become citizens, or oppose it and become temporary or permanent rebels. So childhood is perhaps most interesting at those historical junctures where social identities are strongly contested, when children grow up between constellations of competing authorities, identities and opportunities – familial, religious, political, economic, racial, national and sexual.

Albert Camus’s autobiographical novel, The First Man, is a great source on white settler childhood in Algeria. Its complexities have made me rethink a few assumptions on African history - primarily that it’s OK to use “white settler society” as a shorthand for “racist, imperialist, exploitative, expropriating and privileged white settler society”. Camus was born into a poor, working-class family in Algiers in 1913: if his memoir is accurate then there was no settled or monolithic idea of “White French Algeria” for him to simply grow into. So where do hardened and fanatical French imperial citizens come from?

Roots of settler nationalism

One answer might be family and the home. But Camus’s family were not overtly ideological. The first language of his mother and grandmother was Mahon, a Balearic dialect, and so they were isolated by illiteracy and language from French metropolitan news, ideas and national identity - when quizzed by the young Camus, his mother doesn’t even know that France is “their” country. And children lived in close proximity to Arab lives and livelihoods, linked to this ostensibly separate culture by petty exchange and sensory experience: the coffee roasting in the courtyard, or the sweet-vendors outside the cinema.1

Another explanation might be state education. But school attendance and experience were not uniform: in Camus’s école primaire Arab children were educated alongside Europeans; and few working class children graduated to the more segregated lycée. Short periods of education were not decisive in creating an imperial identity: France was a textbook staple but, for Camus, it was still an exotic and distant place, interesting primarily for its snow and, later, for its sense of history - a history that did not yet extend to Algeria.2

Another influence might be the experience of colonial authority, and its hierarchical treatment of Europeans, Muslims and Jews. But what is striking about Camus’s childhood is how little the government affects his life. The authority he encounters is parental not political. And the sole human face of government is the municipal employee: trolley-bus drivers or an Arab dog-catcher. Crime and disorder erupt sporadically: but Camus has only indirect experience of policing, and no apparent concept of the hierarchical laws it enforced, only a nightmarish knowledge that the death penalty is the ultimate sanction. (This might have been slightly different for indigenous Algerian children.)3

Colonial architectures: leisure in the city

If this analysis is correct then the creation of imperial and settler identities is more subtle, and less structured by the state: it is not a conscious project but a gradual accretion grounded in everyday life. One possibility raised by Camus’s The First Man is the role that urban leisure and architecture played in shaping colonial identities during childhood. The photos below are actually from another French colonial city - Casablanca - but you get the general idea. The following discussion is based solely on Camus’s text.

Figures 1-3. Childhood leisure in 1920s/30s Casablanca: rockpools and blackjack on the beach; the cinema; the public swimming baths4:



The structured leisure activities of children - football and French cinema - were distinctly European. Speaking and reading French also opened up the metropolitan world through movies, the radio, newspapers and comics. And the venues for their unstructured play were creations of colonial architecture, often temporarily emptied of an adult presence: the experimental garden; the WWI veterans’ hospital, where they made poisons with discarded medical paraphenalia; apartment cellars; and a beach studded with bathing huts, separated from the city by a strip of industrial land. The city was divided by colour-coded tramlines; and at the nexus of race- and class-segregated neighbourhoods lay the lycée, the barracks and the Place du Gouvernement. Childhood time, too, had a colonial structure: playtime ended as the trolley-cars switched on their lights near dusk; and the year was split by school-terms.5 Leisure venues may have been multi-racial but perhaps children realised that such architectures, so separate in style and ownership, were a product of the colonial presence - and perhaps European children experienced this as something to which they belonged, and from which North Africans were excluded.

References:
1.Albert Camus, The First Man, (London, 2001), pp36-7,73, 103 162-3.
2.Camus, The First Man, pp112-3, 158, 161-2.
3.Camus, The First Man, pp109-10, 217-8
4.Jean-Louis Coen and Monique Eleb, Casablanca: Colonial Myths and Architectural Ventures, (New York, 2002), pp254, 262, 267.
5.Camus, The First Man, pp39-40, 167-73, 188

Albert Camus, The First Man:
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Lagos: crime and delinquency, past and present

Wednesday, December 12th, 2007

Here is a fascinating mini-documentary on Lagos, the world’s fastest growing mega-city, from current.com.


There is a cameo appearance from the infamous ‘Area Boys’ - a kind of youthful mafia, running protection rackets etc down the local markets. One of my research interests is the emergence and evolution of youth crime in African history, and this video is a nice little reminder of its modern-day relevance. There is also an awesome insight into juju policing: one vigilante claims that his magic can force a criminal to jump up and down on the spot until daybreak - that’s more embarrassing and more energetic than the stocks.

Anyway, Laurent Fourchard wrote a pertinent article about the colonial predecessors of the Area Boys, and their entrenchment in the urban economy by the late-1940s.1 He traces their origins to loosely-knit pickpocket gangs in the late-1920s, and the more organized and hierarchical Boma Boys during WWII.

Boma Boys acted as middlemen between billeted soldiers and the bars, brothels and prostitutes that kept them entertained. It was the sex trade that brought Boma Boys to the attention of the colonial government, primarily because girls as young as twelve were being kidnapped, pawned or sold to work as Lagos prostitutes. The colonial response was an ineffective crackdown on male delinquents, but also legislative restrictions on girls hawking goods on the street, or living in the city without their parents or guardian. The result, Fourchard argues, was the criminalization of the innocent, and the neglect of actual and damaging criminality: there were protection rackets in markets by 1946, and Lagos has suffered its Area Boys ever since.

The article is definitely very interesting but, as Fourchard admits, it is based on adult- and elite-produced sources. The experience of the youths themselves is not really explored - this is the side of delinquency that I’m trying to focus on in my own research. On Area Boys, for example, it would be really useful to track their life histories: what happens when they get older - do they get shoved aside by a new generation, do they become Neighbourhood Uncles, or do they never grow up at all?

References:
1. Fourchard, Laurent, ‘Lagos and the Invention of Juvenile Delinquency in Nigeria, 1920-1960’, Journal of African History, 47 (2006), pp. 115–37.

Review: Robert Calderisi, The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid Isn’t Working

Sunday, December 9th, 2007

“The rest of the world can now do very little for Africa…”

I rather enjoyed Calderisi’s short, readable and stimulating book about aid and development in Africa. Written by an ex-World Bank high-flyer, it deals with the post-1970 years: a period of almost unmitigated failure for Africa. Calderisi vividly illustrates the scale of African economic underperformance: of all the sub-Saharan countries, only Ghana and Uganda have now regained the same real income levels they had in 1970 – the rest have become poorer; and South Korea, poorer than Ghana in 1960, has now become an aid donor to Africa.[151, 156] Calderisi also addresses the political controversy surrounding the remedial economic liberalisation policies of the World Bank and IMF: he argues that this was not the cause of economic woes but a reaction to a more profound economic trend.

For the general reader, a reassessment of the cause and effects of structural adjustment is the most useful – and underdeveloped – aspect of the book. Calderisi argues that internationally directed liberalisation was primarily the result of a massive evaporation of African export markets from the 1970s onwards. In the face of growing international competition from other developing countries, Africa lost $70bn a year: “there was not enough money in the world - let alone in the World Bank - to fill this gap”. [18] He is right to emphasise this missing half of the debate on late-twentieth century Africa: but it is a shame there isn’t more detail on the affected products and sectors, and a detailed analysis of where the lost business went. What, if anything, could Africa have done to staunch the bleeding?

The idea that World Bank and IMF reforms are the cause of African poverty is, however, firmly entrenched in the left/liberal-ish mindset: SAPs were once memorably described to me as a “rolling clusterfuck” across the Ghanaian economy, a metaphor that I have stolen and applied ever since. If Calderisi is to be more persuasive then his argument needs to be more empirically detailed and anecdotally powerful: a counterweight to the emotive personal tales of neglect, suffering and privatisation that currently dominate public perception.

Calderisi is very strong on the unrealities and inefficiencies of many African economies, often caused by the absurdity of subsidising (modern, prestigious) industry at the expense of (dull, backward) agriculture. Forcing farmers in Cote d’Ivoire to use locally produced sacks and state-owned shipping services, for example, protects hundreds of industrial jobs, but imposes a ruinous cost on hundreds of thousands of agricultural producers.[146] He is also strong on corruption. I’ve often thought that elite African politics attracts the same type of people as privatized utilities/monopolies do in the West: why do something well, when you can do something badly and still make a great deal of money? Calderisi’s anecdotal style confirms this view.

The solution, or part of it, is to drastically cut back aid, and make it strictly conditional on good governance and human rights. But is it all doom and gloom? Well, no. His description of new accountability practices in the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project is interesting, although the jury is still out on their effectiveness.[177-95] Calderisi also praises the actions of five “serious” African governments: Ghana, Uganda, Mozambique, Tanzania and Mali. These countries should be given an unconditional blank cheque, and allowed to get on with it.[209-10] Sadly, in the rush to condemn the rest of Africa, Calderisi rather ignores what these governments have done right.

This review has focused on the ideas behind the book, but much of the enjoyment comes from the anecdotal style, and the accounts of everyday life as a World Bank-er in Africa. Many of Calderisi’s stories are eye-opening and optimistic, if partial. He is an engaging writer, and I rattled through the book in one sitting. The one big weakness is an ill-advised attempt to pinpoint an “African” culture that encourages and embeds corruption and bad governance: ideologies are important, but this continent-wide dismissal was pretty unconvincing. That reservation aside, the book is well worth a read, and may alter a few opinions.

Robert Calderisi, The Trouble with Africa:
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